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I. INTRODUCTION
At the May 4, 1994 regular meeting of the Judicial Council of the
United States Courts for the Sixth Circuit, the Council voted to “suspend
further review of local rules until it receives further guidance from Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States or by case law on the
question of whether provisions of the Civil Justice Reform Act take
precedence over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”1 By so doing, the
Council was ostensibly discharging responsibilities assigned to it by the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (JIA) of 1988.2 The JIA
requires that every circuit council periodically survey local rules adopted
by the district courts within the council’s purview for consistency with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Acts of Congress, and it authorizes
each council to modify or abrogate conflicting local directives.3
The Sixth Circuit Judicial Council’s decision may seem inconsequential in the 200-year history of the federal courts. However, the vote is a
telling comment on the confused state of civil procedure and the need to
ameliorate that situation. I wish to employ this apparently innocuous story
* Professor, University of Montana. B.A., 1968, Duke University; LL.B., 1972, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and
Charlotte Wilmerton for technical support, as well as Ann and Tom Boone and the Harris
Trust for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the District of Montana and of the District
Local Rules Review Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council; however, the views expressed here and errors that remain are mine.
1. Judicial Council of Sixth Circuit, U.S. Ct. Appeals, Minutes of Meeting 3-4 (May 4,
1994) (on file with Office of Cir. Exec.) [hereinafter Minutes].
2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2701(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. See id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 assigns similar responsibilities. See infra
notes 8-9, 14-15 and accompanying text. Rule 83’s 1995 amendment also proscribes the adoption of duplicative local procedures. See Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83,
reprinted in 160 F.R.D. 149, 161 (1995). I emphasize inconsistent procedures because they are
more problematic than duplicative procedures and the JIA because it is broader than Rule 83.
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as a starting point for exploring civil procedure’s current condition and
for showing how the Council might resume its review with an approach to
which its members seemed oblivious when voting.
Several reasons explain the decision of the Sixth Circuit Judicial
Council to postpone review. For example, complexity and fragmentation
characterize modern civil procedure. More specifically, Congress did not
state how councils should harmonize the JIA and the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 (CJRA). The Sixth Circuit Council also seemed to want a
consensus before resolving a delicate, close question of authority and was
justifiably concerned about spending scarce resources on an effort that
members believed the CJRA could moot.
The Council prematurely and unnecessarily suspended review, however. It can circumvent the conflict that Council members perceived between the JIA and the CJRA and thereby expeditiously fulfill most of its
review obligations. The issue warrants analysis because all twelve regional circuit judicial councils must confront the same question that the
Sixth Circuit Judicial Council faced when complying with its duties—
responsibilities that few councils have fully satisfied. This Article undertakes that analysis.
The second part of the Article analyzes the national and Sixth Circuit
developments in civil procedure that led the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council
to discontinue review. The third part offers suggestions for addressing
concerns that underlay the Council’s postponement determination and for
resuming the review mandated and discharging the obligations imposed.
II. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE LOCAL RULE REVIEW SUSPENSION
Many procedural developments that apparently prompted the Sixth
Circuit Judicial Council to delay reviewing local rules have received
comparatively thorough evaluation elsewhere.4 However, this Article
comprehensively examines those events because broader assessment
should enhance understanding of the Council’s action. The Article emphasizes developments of the last decade because they are most relevant
to the suspension decision.
A. National Developments
Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 after years of contentious debate.5 The legislation, which constituted a political compromise,
4. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2020-26 (1989); Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 807-09 (1995).
5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 943-61 (1987).
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authorized the United States Supreme Court to adopt procedures to govern
civil disputes in the federal district courts.6 The 1934 statute also empowered the federal districts to “prescribe rules for the conduct of their business [that] shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court.”7
When the Supreme Court promulgated the initial Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, it included Rule 83, which authorizes the federal
districts and individual judges to adopt local civil procedures.8 The Court
apparently intended Rule 83 as a limited grant of power. The Rule essentially authorizes districts and judges to prescribe local requirements that
treat unusual local conditions but proscribes procedures that conflict with
the federal rules or congressional legislation.9
Federal districts and specific judges have honored in the breach both
the original understanding that the grant was narrow and the prohibition
on inconsistency. These districts and judges have prescribed many local
requirements, a number of which conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or United States Code provisions. In the 1980s, the Judicial
Conference of the United States—the federal courts’ policymaking arm—
and the Congress evinced concern about the growth of increasingly inconsistent local civil procedures.
1. Judicial Conference
In 1986, the Judicial Conference commissioned the Local Rules Project to assemble and organize all districts’ local rules, standing orders issued by individual judges, and other local procedural requirements.10 In
1989, the Project issued a thorough report, which found that judges had
adopted some 5000 local rules and many other procedures governing local
6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Carl Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272-77 (1989)
[hereinafter Tobias, Public Law Litigation]. See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and
the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1289 (1994); Burbank, supra
note 5.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993). See generally Robert E. Keeton, The
Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 865-67,
870-1 (1989).
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83; see also Subrin, supra note 4, at 2016-19. See generally
Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 6, at 272-77.
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83; FED. R. CIV. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note. See generally
Keeton, supra note 7; Subrin, supra note 4, at 2011-16.
10. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL
PRACTICE 1 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF LOCAL RULES PROJECT]; see also Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (1989) (summarizing Local Rules
Project). See generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1596-97 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, Improving]; Carl Tobias, Civil
Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1393,
1397-99 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization].
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practice.11 The rules and procedures were diversely denominated as general, standing, special, scheduling, or minute orders. Many of the directives conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Acts of Congress, or local requirements that applied in the remaining ninety-three
districts. Districts and individual judges promulgated and enforced inconsistent procedures, notwithstanding proscriptions on this activity in the
Rules Enabling Act and in Rule 83.12
The federal bench and Congress implemented several responses to the
problems posed by local procedural proliferation.13 The Judicial Conference sponsored the 1985 amendment to Rule 83. This amendment requires
districts to prescribe local rules only after affording public notice and
comment, and it mandates that standing orders of individual judges be
consistent with the federal rules and local rules.14 The revision’s advisory
committee note urged the districts to institute procedures for publishing
and reviewing these standing orders. The note also encouraged the circuit
judicial councils to analyze all local rules for validity and consistency
with the federal rules and with local procedures in the other districts.15
2. Congress
Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act in 1988. The Act’s
objectives were to reduce the proliferation of local procedures and to restore the primacy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.16 Congress
meant to treat local proliferation by regularizing, and opening to public

11. See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 10, at 1; see also Telephone
Interview with Mary P. Squiers, Project Director of Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992)
(notes on file with author); Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, Consultant to the Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992) (notes on file with author). Moreover, a number of individual judges applied numerous unwritten procedures. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit
Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 360 n.2 (1995) [hereinafter
Suggestions].
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 83; see also
Subrin, supra note 4, at 2020-26. See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 10, at 62-65.
13. The Judicial Conference commissioned the Local Rules Project to analyze the difficulties and, after receiving the Project’s Report, it issued an order requesting that districts conform local procedures to the federal rules. See Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1597;
Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 10, at 1399.
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note.
See generally David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal
Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537
(1985).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note; see also supra note 3 (discussing
Rule 83’s 1995 amendment); see generally Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1596.
16. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071-2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991).
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involvement, the procedural revision processes.17 It addressed proliferation by imposing on circuit judicial councils an affirmative duty periodically to monitor local procedures for consistency and by empowering
councils to change or abolish conflicting procedures.18 Congress apparently intended for these requirements to cover individual-judge procedures.19
3. Circuit Judicial Council Implementation
A tiny number of circuit judicial councils have thoroughly effectuated
the local procedural review requirements embodied in revised Rule 83 and
the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act. Numerous significant reasons,
which can be ascribed to Congress and to federal judges, explain the incomplete implementation of those mandates.
A few circuit councils have been reluctant to effectuate the mandates
requiring oversight and abrogation or modification of conflicting local
procedures.20 The several councils that attempted to institute rigorous review have apparently found the task daunting. Monitoring may have been
especially onerous in circuits that encompass many federal districts or that
include districts which have adopted large numbers of local procedures.
Congress did not appropriate any money to implement this feature of the
1988 statute, and that omission complicated the efforts of councils, which
possess relatively few resources for discharging a plethora of difficult duties.
17. See Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1599-1601. See generally Paul D. Carrington,
Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 300-01
(1994).
18. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally Tobias,
Balkanization, supra note 10, at 1401. The JIA, therefore, placed an ongoing responsibility on
councils to review local procedures that existed on the statute’s December 1, 1988 effective
date as well as those subsequently adopted.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1994). The statute made the process
exclusive to prevent districts and judges from avoiding it by describing local procedures as
something other than local rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1600.
20. Circuit judges might have deferred to district judges on councils who know more
about civil litigation in trial courts and within each circuit’s districts. District judges may have
been reluctant to scrutinize or modify procedures that the judges might apply in their own districts or could have lacked sufficient familiarity with the local conditions in the districts whose
procedures they were assessing to alter those requirements found to conflict. Some judges, out of
courtesy or respect for individuals who occupy the identical position in the judicial hierarchy,
might have deferentially evaluated procedures. Local procedural review is also very sensitive because many district judges strongly defend their prerogatives to apply local procedures. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 11, at 363-64; Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 10 at 1406-07. In
the remainder of this subsection, I rely substantially on interviews with many individuals who are
familiar with councils’ implementation efforts, on numerous council documents, and on Tobias,
Suggestions, supra note 11.
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Another significant reason why several circuit councils incompletely
fulfilled the requirements of Rule 83 and the Judicial Improvements Act is
that some aspects of the 1990 CJRA effectively suspended the 1988 JIA’s
implementation.21 For example, the 1990 legislation implicitly suggested
that districts could prescribe inconsistent local procedures for decreasing
cost and delay in civil cases.22 A number of districts accepted this invitation. The Eastern District of Texas adopted a settlement offer provision
that conflicts with Federal Rule 68,23 while the Montana District prescribed a procedure for co-equal assignment of cases to Article III judges
and magistrate judges that is inconsistent with section 636 of Title 28.24
The CJRA correspondingly established circuit review committees, in addition to councils, and imposed on those committees the task of monitoring effectuation of the expense and delay reduction procedures.25
A few circuit councils, accordingly, may have been reluctant to scrutinize or modify local procedures that Congress seemed to authorize and
that Congress instructed a similar, but distinct and new, institution to
oversee.26 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit District Local Rules Review Committee solicited the perspectives of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council on
whether and how the Civil Justice Reform Act affected its review.27 These
factors may explain why the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council decided to discontinue review of local requirements until it received more guidance.28
Despite these problems, several judicial councils have instituted rigorous review or made commendable efforts to satisfy the requirements in-

21. See Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1623-7.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Tobias, Improving, supra note
10, at 1623-27; Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 10, at 1414-22.
23. Compare U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10 (1991) [hereinafter DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN] with FED. R. CIV. P. 68; see also Friends of the Earth v. Chevron, 885 F. Supp. 934
(E.D. Tex. 1995). See generally Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1620.
24. Compare U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3-4 (1991) with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). See generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 10, at 1417; Carl Tobias, The Montana
Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REV. 91, 93 & n.9 (1992).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 474 (Supp. V 1993); see generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra note
10, at 1406-09.
26. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prescribing circuit judicial
councils) with 28 U.S.C. § 474 (Supp. V 1993) (prescribing circuit review committees). See
generally Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1623-27.
27. See Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal
Affairs, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit (July 22, 1994) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Pimentel Interview]; see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 11, at 365-66
(affording additional analysis of Fourth Circuit efforts).
28. See Minutes, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
See generally Tobias, Improving, supra note 10, at 1605 & n.106.
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cluded in Rule 83 and the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act.29 For instance, the Ninth Circuit has depended on numerous volunteer lawyers
and law student interns for assistance in overseeing local district and
bankruptcy procedures.30 The District of Columbia Circuit concomitantly
appointed an entity that worked closely with the district court’s local rules
committee in identifying inconsistent procedures, which the court then
revised.31
B. Sixth Circuit Developments
The Sixth Circuit Judicial Council and the Sixth Circuit Executive Office began considering local procedural review soon after passage of the
1988 JIA and issuance of the Local Rules Project Report.32 The enactment
of the 1990 CJRA apparently delayed the Sixth Circuit’s efforts, although
the Executive Office examined the possibility of local rule review when it
attempted to fulfill certain oversight responsibilities imposed by the
CJRA. Cooperation between the Staff Attorney’s Office and the Sixth
Circuit Review Committee while monitoring implementation of CJRA
procedures fostered the Council’s efforts to comply with the 1988 JIA.33
In 1993, the Sixth Circuit’s Staff Attorney’s Office, on behalf of the
Judicial Council, spent several months reviewing the consistency of rules
of all districts in the Sixth Circuit. It analyzed local rules adopted under
the CJRA or pursuant to other authority as well as general and standing
orders that were incorporated in the local rules. The office designated
potential areas of conflict between local procedures and the federal rules
and Acts of Congress, submitted a thorough list of possibly inconsistent
local requirements to the Council, and made recommendations regarding
conflicts.
At a November 1993 meeting, the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council considered the Staff Attorney’s report but deferred further examination until
after December 1, 1993.34 The Council apparently wanted to evaluate the
effects of the recently promulgated amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Council’s delay also afforded every district an op29. See Pimentel Interview, supra note 27; Telephone Interview with Andrew Tietz, Assistant Circuit Executive, United States Courts for the First Circuit (July 22, 1994) (notes on
file with author) [hereinafter Tietz Interview]; supra note 11.
30. Pimentel Interview, supra note 27; see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 11, at
364-65 (affording additional analysis of Ninth Circuit efforts).
31. Pimentel Interview, supra note 27.
32. See Minutes, supra note 1.
33. Id. See generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 10, at 1406-9.
34. Minutes, supra note 1, at 3; Memorandum from James A. Higgins, Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Sixth Circuit, to Circuit Council, U.S. Courts for the Sixth Circuit
(Apr. 1994) [hereinafter Higgins Memorandum]. Some federal districts voluntarily changed
local rules that the Staff Attorney’s Office found to be clearly inconsistent, although the districts modified few rules that involved questions of interpretation.

990

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:983

portunity to implement procedures in its CJRA expense and delay reduction plan.
The Staff Attorney’s Office continued reviewing local rules after the
November meeting and raised the threshold issue of whether the CJRA’s
provisions empowering each district to experiment with local cost and delay
reduction procedures took precedence over the federal rules and statutory
requirements governing practice.35 The office prepared a memorandum on
inconsistency which observed that the CJRA might render moot the
Council’s review of local rules because the statute could enable local requirements prescribed thereunder to supersede conflicting federal rules of
practice.36 The views of the Staff Attorney’s Office apparently persuaded
the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council. On May 4, 1994, the Judicial Council
voted to suspend additional review of the local procedures until the issue
of whether the CJRA took precedence over the federal rules was addressed by Congress, the Judicial Conference, or decisional law.37
A number of defensible reasons may explain the Council’s decision.
For instance, the Council could have decided to postpone review because
of the confused state of civil procedure and the possibility—albeit remote—that the CJRA might moot the Council’s efforts and squander limited resources. Moreover, the Council may have been concerned about
unclear legislative intent in the JIA and CJRA. Of special concern could
have been the statutory inconsistencies, the difficulty and cost of effectuating the JIA’s cryptic mandates, and Congress’s failure to allocate resources for implementation.
The Sixth Circuit Judicial Council strives to act by consensus. That consensus would have been difficult to achieve for this sensitive, disputed
question of authority because Council members probably differed. After all,
numerous districts and many judges throughout the nation have disagreed
over the precise issue which the Council confronted.38 The Council may
have also found little reason to resolve the issue until Congress or the courts
35. See Memorandum Regarding Conflicts Between Local Rules and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure from Dave Wallace, Staff Attorney, U.S. Courts for the Sixth Circuit, to Ken
Howe, Senior Staff Attorney, U.S. Courts for the Sixth Circuit (Mar. 2, 1994) [hereinafter
Wallace Memorandum]; Higgins Memorandum, supra note 34.
36. Minutes, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also Higgins Memorandum, supra note 34.
37. Minutes, supra note 1, at 3-4.
38. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. For valuable analysis, concluding that
the CJRA affords comparatively limited authority to adopt inconsistent local procedures, see
Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1447 (1994); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992). But see Friends of the Earth v. Chevron, 885 F. Supp.
934 (E.D. Tex. 1995). But cf. Edwin J. Wesley, The Civil Justice Reform Act; The Rules
Enabling Act; The Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83—What
Trumps What?, 154 F.R.D. 563, 574 (1994) (suggesting that the “CJRA trumps the FRCP to
the extent the CJRA specifically deals with a particular matter”). See generally Higgins Memorandum, supra note 34.
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clarified it or the CJRA experimentation concluded.39 In any event, the
Council apparently envisioned that it would resume local procedural review
in 1997, after Congress determined whether the CJRA should “sunset.”
These phenomena make the Council’s decision to suspend local review
seem reasonable; however, that determination was premature and unwarranted. The Council could proceed in a manner that would avoid the dilemma which the Council thought the CJRA created and that would efficaciously and promptly discharge its review duties. I next examine this
prospect and suggest ways in which Congress might help councils fulfill
their responsibilities.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Separation of the CJRA and its potential effect on local procedural review would facilitate the satisfaction of the Council’s review obligations
and, perhaps, save resources.40 The Council should continue its examination of local district court procedures adopted under authority not provided in the CJRA. Districts and specific judges have issued these local
procedures under inherent judicial authority or under power apart from
the statute—namely, additional substantive and procedural legislation such
as the JIA and Rule 83.
The Council should seriously consider expanding its review to encompass local requirements other than local rules, such as general orders and
individual-judge procedures, which a few councils are already monitoring. For instance, the Ninth Circuit District Local Rules Review Committee is scrutinizing general orders that have the effect of local rules.41 The
Sixth Circuit Judicial Council could review such orders and similar directives. The Council originally excluded these procedures from consideration because of concern that some district judges would not be receptive
to such an evaluation.42

39. CJRA experimentation is scheduled to end in 1997, if Congress allows the statute to
expire. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (Supp. V 1993) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§103(b)(2) (1990)). See generally Biden, supra note 6, at 1294.
40. I employ the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council’s experience as an example from which
other councils can extrapolate. For instance, the coincidence that the Sixth Circuit had already
undertaken some review means that some suggestions for identifying local procedures not
based on the CJRA have more applicability to other councils. My recommendations are premised primarily on the work of the Ninth Circuit District Local Rules Review Committee. Congress should address some concerns; most importantly, it should appropriate sufficient resources to allow councils to fulfill their review duties under the JIA and Rule 83. See Tobias,
Suggestions, supra note 11, at 364-65.
41. Telephone Interview with Professor Margaret Johns, U.C. Davis School of Law, and
Chair, Ninth Circuit District Local Rules Review Committee (Sept. 22, 1995) (notes on file
with author) [hereinafter Johns Interview]; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 20 (suggesting that district judges strongly defend their prerogatives to
adopt local procedures).
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The Council, or the Staff Attorney’s Office acting on its behalf, has
several effective means of identifying local procedures not prescribed under the CJRA. The Staff Attorney’s Office could rely on the procedures’
dates of adoption. Most local requirements not authorized under the 1990
enactment were promulgated before CJRA expense and delay reduction
procedures were issued. The Staff Attorney’s Office might also ascertain
which local directives were not prescribed pursuant to the 1990 CJRA by
comparing them with, and excluding from review, requirements adopted
under the legislation, nearly all of which procedures are readily available
in CJRA cost and delay reduction plans.
Reliance on rule adoption dates and the existence of CJRA requirements in civil justice plans should assist in identifying non-CJRA procedures. The two techniques suggested may seem to overstate the ease with
which the relevant local directives can be distinguished. For example, it is
possible to view the CJRA as a comparatively broad grant of power that
arguably authorizes almost any local procedure.43 However, the most persuasive statutory reading, which more accurately reflects congressional
intent, suggests that this power is considerably narrower.44
Certain federal districts have also capitalized on the opportunity offered by the CJRA to reexamine and amend, as warranted, all of their local rules. This activity may appear to complicate designation of the applicable local requirements.45 Insofar as courts in the Sixth Circuit have reevaluated and revised local rules, the Staff Attorney’s Office can identify
the procedures to be reviewed by excluding the amended local rules that
appear in civil justice plans.46 In short, these potential problems seem
relatively minor or are easily remediable.
Once the attorney’s office has isolated those local procedures that were
not prescribed under the CJRA, it can review them for consistency with
the federal rules and with congressional legislation. A valuable starting
point would be the list of conflicting local procedures which the Staff Attorney’s Office compiled before the Council suspended review. The Staff
43. See DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 23, at 9 (asserting that “to the extent that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan, the Plan has precedence
and is controlling”); see also Friends of the Earth v. Chevron, 885 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Tex.
1995); see generally supra note 38.
44. See Robel, supra note 38; see also Mullenix, supra note 38; see generally supra note
38.
45. A number of districts have apparently reconsidered and amended, as indicated, their
local rules. See Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 11, at 366 (identifying Eastern District of
Virginia, Northern District of West Virginia, Southern District of West Virginia); Carl Tobias,
Refining Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 539, 542-43 (1995)
(identifying District of Montana).
46. No districts in the Sixth Circuit appear to have reexamined and amended local rules;
however, my research is not definitive because it is difficult to secure reliable information. If
the concern that I have expressed is irrelevant to the Sixth Circuit, it remains applicable to
councils in other circuits whose districts have reconsidered and revised local rules.
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Attorney’s Office should supplement its 1993 effort by designating any
subsequently promulgated local procedures. However, districts and judges
probably adopted many of those requirements pursuant to the CJRA.47
The Staff Attorney’s Office then could assemble a complete compendium of conflicting procedures and offer thorough explanations for the inconsistencies of the requirements.48 The Council next should transmit this
material to districts and individual judges. Districts and judges could explain why their provisions were adopted and why they believe the requirements do not conflict with federal rules or statutes. Districts and judges also
would be able to abolish or change rules that they agree are inconsistent.
Finally, after consulting the districts’ and judges’ reasons for conflicts, the
Council should abrogate or modify particular local requirements that remain
inconsistent.
The Council has several options for treating local procedures that districts and courts have promulgated pursuant to the CJRA. First, it could
simply ignore them for purposes of the review recommended above. Second, the Council could compile a list of the requirements and defer their
analysis until 1997, when Congress determines whether the CJRA should
sunset.
If Congress decides that the statute must expire, local procedures
adopted under it should expire also.49 Were districts or judges to continue
applying local requirements predicated on the CJRA, judicial councils
would need to review those procedures under the suggested process. If
Congress extends the enactment, it must clarify the relationship between
the JIA and the CJRA, particularly by stating whether procedures based
on the CJRA supersede the federal rules and United States Code provisions.
Another option, should the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council resume its
review before 1997, would be a more ambitious scrutiny of directives
47. I believe that the Sixth Circuit’s districts are typical. The three Early Implementation
Districts (EID) adopted civil justice plans and prescribed nearly all CJRA procedures before
1992. These and many EIDs elsewhere have subsequently modified some rules, namely, those
governing automatic disclosure, a controversial discovery technique. See DONNA STIENSTRA ,
IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO
COURTS’ RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
26 (1996); see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49, 56
(1992) (providing list of EIDs); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145
F.R.D. 139 (1993) (analyzing disclosure). Non-EIDs only had to issue civil justice plans by
December 1993. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (Supp. V 1993) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101650, § 102 (1990)); see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
48. The approach in this paragraph is the one that the Ninth Circuit Committee is following. Johns Interview, supra note 41.
49. Local procedures adopted under the CJRA, but which find support in other authority,
such as other federal statutes, the JIA, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or inherent judicial authority, need not expire. I direct some suggestions in this paragraph to Congress. Regardless of how Congress resolves the CJRA’s fate, it must allocate adequate funding for
councils to discharge their review obligations under the JIA and Rule 83.
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premised on the CJRA. For instance, while the Staff Attorney’s Office is
designating and monitoring procedures that were not adopted under the
statute, it could identify local requirements prescribed pursuant to the
CJRA and which it thinks may be inconsistent, state the reasons for its
beliefs, and circulate that information to districts and judges for their responses.50
This approach would enable the Council to abrogate or modify inconsistent procedures in 1997, should Congress 1) permit the CJRA to expire
and courts or judges fail to abolish local CJRA-based rules or 2) extend
the CJRA but clearly state that requirements prescribed under it do not
take precedence. The Council should recognize that were it to undertake
more ambitious review, its efforts might be wasted. This could happen if
Congress allows the legislation to expire and districts and judges abrogate
local procedures predicated on the enactment, or if Senators and Representatives extend the statute but do not indicate whether local requirements adopted thereunder take precedence.
There are numerous reasons why the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council
should follow the approach suggested above. As a practical matter, districts in the Sixth Circuit have promulgated relatively few local procedures pursuant to the CJRA’s grant of authority, a factor that will facilitate the Council’s review.51 Resuming review of local requirements that
were not premised upon the CJRA will save much time otherwise lost
waiting for Congress to decide whether the legislation should expire in
1997.
The Council can now review all local rules not prescribed under the
CJRA. It must perform that task anyway once Congress resolves the
CJRA’s fate. The Council would also be prepared in 1997 to treat conflicting CJRA procedures should Congress allow the legislation to expire and
districts and judges fail to abolish local requirements promulgated under it,
or should Congress extend the statute but state that it does not take precedence. This approach would enable the Council to make considerable progress toward complying with its duties under the JIA and Rule 83, obligations that have remained essentially unfulfilled. Finally, satisfying those responsibilities should reduce the proliferation of inconsistent local procedures
and restore the primacy of the federal rules, thereby effectuating important
purposes of Congress and the Supreme Court in passing the JIA and amending
Federal Rule 83.

50. This approach is similar to the one which I suggested above for local procedures that
are not based on the CJRA.
51. Wallace Memorandum, supra note 35.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Several plausible reasons explain why the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council
postponed its review of local procedures for consistency with the federal
rules and United States Code provisions. Nonetheless, the Council’s suspension decision was premature and unnecessary. By ignoring local requirements adopted under authority of the CJRA, the Council could avoid
the problem that it perceived the CJRA created. The Council should resume
review of local rules adopted under other authority. The Council could then
fulfill its review obligations under the JIA and Rule 83 and facilitate the
realization of significant congressional and Supreme Court objectives relating to local procedural proliferation.

